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ABSTRACT
For some crimes the entire law enforcement process can now
be automated. No humans are needed to detect the crime, identify the
perpetrator, or impose punishment. While automated systems are
cheap and efficient, governments and citizens must look beyond these
obvious savings as manual labor is replaced by robots and
computers.
Inefficiency and indeterminacy have significant value in
automated law enforcement systems and should be preserved.
Humans are inefficient, yet more capable of ethical and
contextualized decision-making than automated systems. Inefficiency
is also an effective safeguard against perfectly enforcing laws that
were created with implicit assumptions of leniency and discretion.
This Article introduces a theory of inefficiently automated law
enforcement built around the idea that those introducing or
increasing automation in one part of an automated law enforcement
system should ensure that inefficiency and indeterminacy are
preserved or increased in other parts of the system.
A theory of governance is critical for those who implement and
administer automated law enforcement systems. Without it, systems
become unmoored from ethics. Ironically, failure to responsibly
automate law enforcement risks creating systems that actually
undermine law and democracy. One way to preserve ethics in
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automated law enforcement systems is to preserve ethical actors,
inefficiency and all.
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INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF AUTOMATION
While it may sound like science fiction, the automation of law
enforcement is already here. Knightscope, a Sunnyvale-based
robotics company, has designed a robot to support law enforcement
personnel.1 USA Today reporter Marco della Cava compares K5, a
300-pound robot, to a conflation of two other well-known
Hollywood robots: R2-D2 and Wall-E.2 In contrast to these popular
1. See KNIGHTSCOPE, http://www.knightscope.com/about.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2016).
2. Marco della Cava, Change Agents: William Li’s Robot Wants to Police
You, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
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cinema icons, however, Knightscope designed K5 for a specific law
enforcement function—a hardwired and multi-wheeled Dirty Harry.3
Della Cava writes: “[T]he robot’s friendly vibe masks the serious
intent of the company’s CEO, William Li: to develop an evergrowing army of K5s that would roam shopping malls, corporate
campuses and other public places with a mission to collect and
analyze data, and tip off law enforcement to potential issues.”4
K5, which can travel up to 18 mph, has the capacity to scan
1,500 license plates a minute, a vast improvement in speed and
efficiency over its human counterpart.5 While this seemingly benign
mission of data collection and analysis—performed in the appealing
trappings of a space-aged mall cop—might sound like a positive
trend in leveraging technology to enhance public welfare and
efficiency while decreasing cost (its estimated cost is $6.25 per hour
of operation6), we must consider the legal implications and social
impact of such an endeavor.7 Addressing what he calls “robophobia,”
Knightscope CEO William Santana Li writes in his blog:
[A]lthough it may be natural for folks to fear what lies ahead, it can [be
more] exciting and productive to imagine the possibilities—and make
them happen for the benefit of society as a whole. That is exactly what we
are doing at Knightscope—an honorable mission to reduce crime by 50%.8

The benefits that robotic technology will bring to law enforcement—
particularly in the areas of efficiency and cost savings—are
theoretically impressive; however, employment of these technologies
without careful consideration poses a distinct danger to our civil
liberties and can have detrimental effects on society.9
2014/01/26/knightscope-k5-police-robot/4018047. See also Masahiro Mori’s
“Uncanny Valley,” originally published in 1970 and officially translated into
English in 2012, which explores the positive and sometimes repulsive aspects of
robot aesthetics due to their similarity to humans. Masahiro Mori, The Uncanny
Valley, IEEE ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION MAG., June 2012, at 98 (Karl F.
MacDorman & Norri Kageki trans.).
3. See della Cava, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. As a point of comparison, $6.25 per hour for K5 is less than the current
$7.25 per hour federal minimum wage in the United States. See Minimum Wage
Laws in the States - January 1, 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/
whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
8. William Santana Li, Why Are We Robophobic?, KNIGHTSCOPE,
http://knightscope.com/media.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
9. We note that a society where everyone is surveilled is a society where
everyone is presumed guilty at the outset. Mr. Li wants to “prevent” crime, but in
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Enhanced automated capability raises some important
questions. What, if anything, is novel about automated law
enforcement systems? How much authority should we bestow upon
these automated systems? To what extent are technologists and
policy makers able to produce a system capable of exercising
discretion and accounting for context in the same way humans can?
Even if an automated law enforcement system is capable of
achieving total legal compliance by the populous, is perfect
enforcement of a law ever desirable? Prudence is therefore necessary
as we embrace seemingly inevitable force multipliers in our brave
new world of enhanced automated law enforcement.
Enforcement of the law has thus far been largely a manual
process, one moderated by the discretion of human judgment and
finite human resources, which were focused on priority offenses.
Relatively speaking, this process is inefficient. Increasingly however,
the law enforcement process can be automated partially (and, in
some cases, completely) from surveillance to punishment. Red-light
cameras and speeding tickets automatically issued by drones display
the potential for automated enforcement in its early stages. The
ubiquity of networked sensor devices, increases in processing power
at lower cost, demands for revenue, and desires to increase public
safety and security are seemingly leading to an era of productized
automated law enforcement systems.10 If we want, inefficiency can
be a thing of the past.
Yet, policy makers are unsure how to properly regulate
automated systems.11 This is a problem because it seems that
automated law enforcement systems will inevitably become more
powerful and effective. If left unchecked, automated law
enforcement systems could cause significant social harm despite
reality he is just developing a means to more efficiently “detect” crimes. Will the
one result in the other?
10. See LISA SHAY ET AL., CONFRONTING AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT
(2012),
http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Shay-EtAlConfrontingAutomatedLawEnf.pdf; see also Cyrus Farivar, Perfect Enforcement:
On the Ground in the Red Light Camera Wars, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:00
PM) [hereinafter Farivar, Perfect Enforcement], http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/12/perfect-enforcement-on-the-ground-in-the-red-light-camera-wars;
Cyrus
Farivar, Arizona Town Mounts Dozens of New License Plate Readers in Fake
Cactuses, ARS TECHNICA (May 8, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/05/arizona-town-mounts-dozens-of-new-license-plate-readers-in-fakecactuses.
11. For an example of the general uncertainty, see Farivar, Perfect
Enforcement, supra note 10.
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attempting to improve public welfare. Anecdotes of partially or fully
automated law enforcement, such as license plate readers and crowdcontrol robots, are becoming increasingly common. The
implementation of these systems has been haphazard and
atheoretical. There is no guiding principle for policy makers and
enforcement officers to ensure that automated law enforcement
systems fulfill their objective in a way that respects privacy and civil
liberties. Yet these same systems continue to proliferate in our dayto-day lives.
This Article aims to remedy the dearth of guidance by
developing a theory of inefficiently automated law enforcement. The
central premise of this theory is that inefficiency and indeterminacy
(usually in the form of human actors with free will) are vital
components within the law enforcement process and should be
conserved in some form. When one aspect of a law enforcement
process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is automated to increase
efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and indeterminacy should
generally be proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the
process to prevent harms from automation. In short, we argue that
inefficiency and human intervention should be conserved in
automated enforcement systems through reallocation.
Making the discrete aspects of an automated system of law
enforcement symbiotic through this conservation principle has at
least two advantages. First, it forces policy makers to consider
enforcement systems holistically, which will reduce internal conflict
and unintended consequences. Additionally, it designates
indeterminacy and inefficiency as necessary and desirable
components of any automated law enforcement process, not
weaknesses in the system, as they first might appear. Rather, they are
essential checks and balances to maintain a civil and sustainable rule
of law system.
In order to help develop this theory of conservation, this Article
also imposes order on the seemingly haphazard milieu of unmanned
regulation by providing an end-to-end analysis of automatic law
enforcement systems. In Part I of this Article, we propose a revised
taxonomy of three discrete aspects of an automated law enforcement
system, conceptualized as surveillance, analysis, and action. A
deeper understanding of each sub-component, and the larger process
as a whole, allows for more effective analysis of automated law
enforcement proposals. In Part II of this Article, we delineate
specific, undesirable societal outcomes stemming from unchecked,
ungoverned automation of surveillance, analysis, and action. In
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Part III of this Article, we develop our conservation theory of
automated law enforcement by explicating the value of inefficiency
and indeterminism and the possible harms from automation to be
avoided through conservation. We then explore how the theory
might be applied using several scenarios. This Article concludes that
while increases in automation seem inevitable, law enforcement
agencies should carefully maintain checks and balances with
appropriate applications of inefficiency or indeterminism.
A theory of governance is critical for those who implement and
administer automated law enforcement systems. Without it, systems
become unmoored from ethics in the pursuit of efficiency. Failure to
responsibly automate law enforcement risks creating systems that
undermine law and democracy.
I. A REVISED TAXONOMY OF AUTOMATING LAW ENFORCEMENT
We have used the concept of “automating laws” as shorthand in
previous research for the automation of various parts of the legal
process.12 We define automated law enforcement (ALE) as any
computer-based system that uses input from unattended sensors to
algorithmically determine that a crime has been or is about to be
committed and then takes some responsive action, such as to warn
the subject or inform the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Additionally, these systems will be capable of automatically
imposing some form of punishment. In order to apply conservation
theory to ALE, each aspect of the legal process must be broken down
into its constituent parts and critically examined to determine the
risks and rewards of automation.
At the highest level of abstraction, we define three major actors
interacting in three major parts of a process. That model consists of
(1) a subject, the person monitored who may or may not commit a
crime; (2) law enforcement agencies that conduct surveillance,
analysis, and enforcement; and (3) a judicial system that determines
guilt and imposes punishment in certain cases. There are also
feedback mechanisms that relay warnings and notices of crimes back
to the subject and to the designated agency. In a perfect case, the
interplay among these actors results in criminals being caught,
accurately judged, and fairly punished. In reality, the results are far

12.

See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10.
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messier.13 The three major components of automated law
enforcement include (1) surveillance, (2) analysis (resulting in a
determination of guilt or innocence), and (3) action (resulting in
punishment or freedom). Automation anywhere in these three areas
can trigger the considerations listed later in this Article.
Surveillance includes all actions to detect that a crime has been
committed, such as eyewitness or victim reports, observations by
police officers (or private security personnel), and electromechanical sensors (such as cameras, radar guns, and GPS trackers),
which may or may not be operated by law enforcement agencies.
The technology and systems we suggest provide data readily
available to law enforcement; however, other systems that might
require judicial approval may also provide significant surveillance
data, such as smart homes,14 private CCTV systems, or mobile
devices. A comprehensive listing of all surveillance measures is
beyond the scope of this paper, but the defining characteristics we
suggest—speed (human or machine), unique subject identifier, and
location information—may be applied to other technologies, as
desired. In previous research, we identified location, time, tracking,
velocity, and identification as all being subject to automated
surveillance.15 We also suggest the study of future candidate
attributes, including more accurate time and location measurements,
accuracy identification rates, and percent coverage of a given area.16
Surveillance ends with the determination that a crime may have been
committed. This determination and all evidence are passed to the
next stage—analysis.
13. The problem is compounded by the use of automation in an attempt to
gain efficiencies at various points in the process. Such automation can be a single
step in a given process, as in the case of a speed gun used by a police officer to
identify the speed of a passing motorist, after which largely manual processes are
used to proceed. However, an end-to-end automated system may be constructed in
an attempt to automate virtually all aspects of law enforcement for a given law or set
of laws with little to no human oversight. As an example, consider a red-light
camera system that identifies violations, performs license plate recognition,
conducts driving record retrieval, employs algorithmic adjudication, and
automatically prints and mails citations to vehicle owners, all with only a cursory
inspection performed by a human law enforcement official to limit errors.
14. For one example of a smart home package, see AT&T DIGITAL LIFE,
https://my-digitallife.att.com/learn (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). See also Tanya
Bodell, Why Google Bought Nest for $3.2 Billion, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (Feb. 25,
2014), http://www.elp.com/articles/print/volume-92/issue-1/columns/why-googlebought-nest-for-3-2-billion.html.
15. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10.
16. Id.
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The analysis stage consists of actions taken to identify the
alleged perpetrator and to determine guilt or innocence of the
suspect. These actions can include human investigation, human
interrogation of suspects or witnesses (possibly augmented with
technology), computer analysis of surveillance data, and manual or
automated “mining” of multiple datasets to establish connections
between individuals or between an individual and an action in the
crime (“data mining”).17 The analysis stage also includes a
determination as to whether the case should proceed to trial and, if
so, includes the trial itself. The end of the analysis stage is a
determination of guilt or innocence for each defendant and a
sentencing decision.
The action stage consists of carrying out the sentence or
administrative action, via embarrassment or shaming,18 delivering a
ticket, manual or automatic monitoring of probation (e.g., using a
GPS bracelet), incarceration, or in extreme cases, execution.19
17. The NSA is a natural example. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive
Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 10, 2006, 10:38 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm;
Alexander Dryer, How the NSA Does “Social Network Analysis,” SLATE (May 15,
2006, 6:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2006/
05/how_the_nsa_does_social_network_analysis.html. Other examples include
Mudhakar Srivatsa & Mike Hicks, Deanonymizing Mobility Traces: Using Social
Networks as a Side-Channel, in ACM SIGSAC, CSS’12: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2012 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 628
(2012), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2382262, and Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly
Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in IEEE COMPUTER
SOCIETY, SP ‘08: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND
PRIVACY 111 (2008), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1398064 (detailing the
famous Netflix Prize dataset deanonymization). See also PREDPOL,
https://www.predpol.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2016); Mark Gibbs, Predicting Crime
with Big Data . . . Welcome to “Minority Report” for Real, NETWORK WORLD (Sept.
20, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2686051/big-databusiness-intelligence/predicting-crime-with-big-data-welcome-to-minority-reportfor-real.html.
18. See Lynn DeBruin, ‘Shame’ Punishments Increasing: Judges Order
Ponytail Cutting, Sleeping in Doghouse, Wearing Embarrassing Signs, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 26, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/26/shamepunishments-judge-orders-ponytail_n_1627010.html. Consider also the use of
offender registries, such as the National Sex Offender Database, DRU SJODIN NAT’L
SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, http://www.nsopr.gov (last visited Jan. 14, 2016), and
online arrest search systems, for example BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFF.,
https://www.sheriff.org/apps/arrest (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
19. See Ralph Kirkland Gable & Robert S. Gable, Electronic Monitoring:
Positive Intervention Strategies, 69 FED. PROB. J. 21 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=210867. For a detailed walkthrough including
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Consider this taxonomy in the context of red-light cameras.
Sensors in the form of cameras are activated when a vehicle enters
an intersection after the light has turned red (often with a “grace
period” of 0.1 to 0.2 seconds):
These pictures document the date, time, and speed of the vehicle. Red
light cameras also typically capture a picture of the vehicle entering the
intersection and a picture of the vehicle in the intersection, both during the
red phase. Individual jurisdictions or camera vendors then process the
pictures and issue the citation to the owner of the offending vehicle.20

Depending on the specific law the system attempts to enforce, each
of these stages in the taxonomy is amenable to automation to varying
degrees, ranging from effectively impossible using today’s
technology to easily accomplished. In some cases, the entire process,
from start to finish, may be automated. For example, red-light
cameras (automated surveillance) might trigger on a car crossing the
intersection when the light is red, which would then look up the
license plate number to find the address of the registered owner
(automated analysis) and then print and mail a ticket to the registered
owner’s address (automated action).
We anticipate such systems will increase in efficiency over
time as sensing, networking, and processing technologies improve.
The rate at which such systems are fielded, employed, and upgraded
in practice will depend on several factors, including financial cost
(and potentially financial incentives), performance, usability, and
acceptability. However, we believe the ultimate driver will be
demands of national, regional, and local policy makers; law
enforcement officials; or the public for greater use, efficiencies, and
cost savings.

discussion of the ticket (notice of liability), see City of Yonkers Red Light Camera
Safety Program, CITY OF YONKERS, NY, http://www.cityofyonkers.com/government/
departments/parking-violations-bureau/red-light-cameras-how-it-works-locations
(last visited Jan. 14, 2016). To be fair, much of the automation occurs at the lower
end of the scale. However, autonomous weapon systems are technically feasible and
examples have been in use since the Cold War, so execution is possible (more or
less) to automate. See Michael Carl Haas, Autonomous Weapon Systems: The
Military’s Smartest Toys?, NAT’L INT., http://nationalinterest.org/feature/
autonomous-weapon-systems-the-militarys-smartest-toys-11708 (last visited Jan. 14,
2016).
20. KIMBERLY ECCLES ET AL., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., NCHRP REPORT 729: AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT FOR SPEEDING AND RED
LIGHT RUNNING 3-4 (2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_
rpt_729.pdf.
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The degrees of automation will vary between contexts, but
there are examples of how levels of automation might be created. For
example, consider the Society of Automotive Engineers
International’s Levels of Driving Automation for On-Road
Vehicles.21 From Level 0 (No Automation) and Level 1 (Driver
Assistance) to Level 4 (High Automation) and Level 5 (Full
Automation), the model plots four different variables: (1) Execution
of Steering and Level of Acceleration/Deceleration; (2) Monitoring
of Driving Environment; (3) Fallback Performance of Dynamic
Driving Task; and (4) System Capability (driving modes).22
Levels of automation might look similar for surveillance,
analysis, or enforcement of traffic laws. Levels of automation could
be based on variables such as whether humans conduct surveillance,
process or analyze data, or review decisions; whether any of these
actions are at fully automated machine speed or slower based on
degrees of human involvement; and whether humans are physically
present at the location of surveillance, analysis, or enforcement.
From the perspective of law enforcement and government
officials, improvements to automated law enforcement systems are
not guaranteed. Citizens may petition for the limitation or removal of
automated law enforcement systems, and many have already done
so.23 Subjects or their supporters may employ a wide range of
countermeasures, especially technical and policy countermeasures
that reduce efficiency of a system.24 Technical countermeasures
would strive to deny, degrade, deceive, corrupt, usurp, or destroy
sensing, networking, storage, and processing capabilities of the
system.25 Policy countermeasures undermine the legal authorities,
which allow use of the system by legitimate entities.26
21. Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor
Vehicle Automated Driving Systems, SAE INT’L, http://standards.sae.org/j3016_
201401/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
22. Id.
23. Cyrus Farivar, Iowa City to Ban Red-Light Cameras, Drones, and
License Plate Readers Too, ARS TECHNICA (June 4, 2013, 7:45 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/iowa-city-to-ban-not-only-red-lightcameras-but-drones-license-plate-readers-too/.
24. Lisa A. Shay et al., Beyond Sunglasses and Spray Paint: A Taxonomy of
Surveillance Countermeasures, in IEEE, 2013 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY (ISTAS) 191 (2013).
25. Noah Shachtman, ‘Degrade, Disrupt, Deceive’: U.S. Talks Openly
(Aug.
28,
2012,
5:00
AM),
About
Hacking
Foes,
WIRED
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/degrade-disrupt-deceive/.
26. See Rachel Weiner, Cuccinelli to Work on NSA Class-Action Lawsuit,
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/

Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement

1773

It is important to conceptualize law enforcement as a process
with discrete parts for purposes of automation. Key stakeholders
with the power to implement law enforcement systems might not be
aware of the ripple effects that automating one aspect of a system
might have on the other aspects. For example, if surveillance is
automated, much more information can be gleaned from that
surveillance at a reduced transaction cost. Should analysis of this
dramatically larger pile of information also be automated in order to
keep up? If the decision-making process is automated and flags a
significantly higher number of legal violations, should enforcement
actions also be automated in order to avoid a systemic apathy to
identified crimes? In the Part below, we explore potential social costs
of automation at each point in an automated law enforcement system
as well as holistically.
II. SOCIAL COSTS OF AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
A. Surveillance
The social cost of automated surveillance is potentially
profound, but our society has already been subjected to it with
increasing scope and depth over the past several years. Until
relatively recently, significant and collective outcry has failed to
emerge. Certainly social activists and “robophobes” have always
raised concern at the potential Orwellian turn of automated law
enforcement in our everyday lives; these voices normally have fallen
on society’s margins, however, and rarely have they voiced a
collective sentiment.27 This passive acceptance seems to have
cuccinelli-to-work-on-nsa-class-action-lawsuit/2014/01/06/1832ee22-7720-11e38963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html; James Warren, White House Task Force Report on
NSA Spying Recommends Sweeping Reforms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18, 2013,
6:00 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/white-house-release-reportreforms-nsa-spying-article-1.1551792.
27. Relatively unknown groups such as the National Motorists Association
provide information for red-light camera activists. Red-Light Cameras, NAT’L
MOTORISTS ASS’N, https://www.motorists.org/issues/red-light-cameras/ (last visited
Jan. 14, 2016). About the National Motorists Association, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N,
https://www.motorists.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). One recent success
occurred in Arlington, Texas, where activists succeeded in collecting more than
11,000 signatures to force city leaders to put the issue on the ballot. See Anna A.
Tinsley, Red-Light Cameras May Soon Be Shut Off in Arlington, THE STARTELEGRAM (May 9, 2015), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/
election/article20602842.html. Fifty-nine percent of voters supported banning the
cameras. See id.; see also Texas Tea Party Takes On Red Light Cameras, and $18-
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changed recently with the intense media focus on Edward Snowden’s
leaked classified information about the National Security Agency’s
global automated surveillance system.28 The body politic the system
was designed and employed to protect now turns against it for its
deep invasiveness and troubling secrecy.
Consider the recent report that the United Kingdom’s
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) allegedly
conducted a vast, comprehensive surveillance and recording of
Yahoo webcam users’ online activities in an aptly titled operation
named Optic Nerve.29 Reporters Spencer Ackerman and James Ball,
pulling from Snowden’s leaked NSA documents, reported the
following:
GCHQ files dating between 2008 and 2010 explicitly state that a
surveillance program codenamed Optic Nerve collected still images of
Yahoo webcam chats in bulk and saved them to agency databases,
regardless of whether individual users were an intelligence target or not.
In one six-month period in 2008 alone, the agency collected webcam
imagery—including substantial quantities of sexually explicit
communications—from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts
globally.30

This automated surveillance, ostensibly conducted in the
interest of national security, jeopardizes the privacy of millions of
citizens across the globe.31 The digital gaze—previously limited by
the human eye in scope and duration—now has the potential for
deepening and widening penetration, as well as increasingly longterm archivability for future law enforcement analysis and
deployment.
U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, equated
the controversial archiving of private Internet communication to the
an-Hour ‘Supporters,’ FOX NEWS (May 6, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2015/05/06/texas-tea-party-leader-fights-for-amendment-that-would-ban-red-lighttraffic/.
28. Edward Snowden and the National Security Agency Leak, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-and-thenational-security-agency-leak/0033078e-d2c6-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_topic.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
29. Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo
Webcam Images Intercepted by GCHQ, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 5:31 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internetyahoo.
30. Id.
31. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934 (2013).
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collection of books in a library; most of those books will never be
opened, he stated, just as most of the archived email traffic will
never be directly read by a human analyst.32 “So the task for us in the
interest of preserving security and preserving civil liberties and
privacy,” says Clapper, “is to be as precise as we possibly can be
when we go in that library and look for the books that we need to
open up and actually read.”33
B. Analysis
Removing the human element from the analysis phase is likely
the most troubling to critics of a completely automated law
enforcement system. For it is human discretion—the intrinsic value
of mitigation and extenuation—that would be missing without a
human in “the loop.”
Philosophers have long asserted that a law, no matter how wellintentioned or clearly stated, cannot be appropriate for all people in
all circumstances. Consider Plato’s analysis of government in The
Statesman:
[A] law would never be capable of comprehending with precision for all
simultaneously the best and the most just and enjoining the best, for the
dissimilarities of human beings and of their actions and the fact that
almost none of the human things is ever at rest do not allow any art
whatsoever to declare in any case anything simple about all and over the
entire time.34

Given that laws must be adapted, interpreted, and even
replaced, as times and circumstances change, it is clear that analysis
leading to decisions of guilt or innocence should not be left entirely
to an automated, inflexible system. Humans are ideally suited for
performing this adaptation and interpretation, since humans are the
beings whose actions are affected and regulated by these laws. In
contrast, the actions of computers or robots are governed by
deterministic programs, which are rarely designed to adapt or change
and that receive neither benefit nor harm from a law, whether just or

32. Bruce Schneier, NSA Robots Are ‘Collecting’ Your Data, Too, and
They’re Getting Away with It, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:39 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/27/nsa-robots-algorithmsurveillance-bruce-schneier.
33. Id.
34. PLATO, THE BEING OF THE BEAUTIFUL: PLATO’S THEAETETUS, SOPHIST,
AND STATESMAN 294e (Seth Benardete trans., 1984).
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unjust or whether applied fairly or unfairly.35 While ultimately these
algorithms are designed by humans, they require all contextual
decisions to be made ex ante, thus limiting the ability for human
discretion to mitigate seemingly unjust or excessive enforcement of a
particular law. Therefore, the analysis portion of the automated law
enforcement system, which concludes with a determination of guilt
or innocence, must at some point be tempered ex ante or
simultaneously with automation by human judgment.
C. Action
As automated surveillance increases in power and scope and
crime detection is further perfected, is our legal system justified
tolerating criminality by intentionally ignoring known violations of
the law? Does perfect detection obligate perfect enforcement or risk
undermining the rule of law, an essential component of our social
fabric? Or should flexibility or a level of toleration be engineered
into the automated system so that illegal behavior isn’t detected and
then purposefully ignored? If so, what principles allow designers to
shape this forgiveness ex ante? At the root of these questions is the
legitimacy of toleration within our legal system.36 As we will argue
below, perhaps simply preserving inefficiency and indeterminacy as
a matter of design and procedure will help avoid these social costs
without having to set principles of forgiveness in stone.
Slovenian Marxist philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek
asserts in The Plague of Fantasies that:
[F]ar from undermining the rule of the Law, its ‘transgression’ in fact
serves as its ultimate support. So it is not only that transgression relies on,
presupposes, the Law it transgresses; rather, the reverse case is much more
pertinent: Law itself relies on its inherent transgression, so that when we
suspend this transgression, the Law itself disintegrates.37

While Žižek may overstate the importance of transgression, or
disobedience, for the stability of our legal system, the capacity to
transcend judicial boundaries is inarguably essential to the
establishment of those constraints in the first place. Why else would
35. LISA SHAY ET AL., DO ROBOTS DREAM OF ELECTRIC LAWS?: AN
EXPERIMENT IN THE LAW AS ALGORITHM 25 (2013), http://conferences.law.stanford.
edu/werobot/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2013/04/Shay-et-al_Lisa.pdf.
36. See Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to
Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 1,
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v14i4/article13.pdf.
37. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 77 (1997).
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legal restrictions exist? They would be unnecessary and redundant in
a world in which automation prevents transgression. Intent, criminal
or not, would thereby be trumped preemptively and always. Such a
world strips human agency from us by disallowing deviancy and
rebellion; risk-taking; and that justified, isolated breach. A safer,
more docile world we would have perhaps, but absent the free will
that necessitates governance in the first place, we should question the
foundation of those very systems that strip away our ability to
challenge codified legal constraints.
Equally important to this need to be free to disobey—to
transgress—is, of course, our desire and, indeed, our innate need to
choose to obey.38 If compliance as a forced function reaches its fully
automated capacity of total enforcement, then we can no longer be
deemed a “law-abiding society,” for instead we would be
imprisoned—not abiding by choice—within an artificially
constrained world, potentially constrained in both our public and
private spheres. What then of responsible citizenry?
In his book Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society
Needs to Thrive, Bruce Schneier echoes many social advocates
before him when he writes that law breaking is at times necessary for
social change.39 In fact, law breaking under certain circumstances
might be just as critical to our social fabric as abiding by the law. We
might consider such famous and morally justified breaches of the
law by noted activists like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma
Ghandi.40 In his highly influential essay “Civil Disobedience,” Henry
David Thoreau writes, “[I]f [the machine of government] is of such a
nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then
I say, break the law.”41 Thoreau was responding, in part, to his moral
outrage against slavery and the Mexican–American War. Imagine a
society in which morally justified civil disobedience like Thoreau’s
is made impossible by perfected surveillance and enforcement, when
transgression rises to the level of a moral imperative yet is stymied
38. See Ian R. Kerr, Digital Locks and the Automation of Virtue, in
“RADICAL EXTREMISM” TO “BALANCED COPYRIGHT”: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND
THE DIGITAL AGENDA 247 (Michael Geist ed., 2010).
39. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT
SOCIETY NEEDS TO THRIVE (2012).
40. See MAHATMA GANDHI, THE ESSENTIAL GANDHI: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
HIS WRITINGS ON HIS LIFE, WORK, AND IDEAS (Louis Fischer ed., 2002); MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (Clayborne
Carson ed., 2001).
41. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 9
(Digireads.com 2005).
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by the totality of our brave new system, an unchallengeable
“machine of government.”42 How might this affect our individual and
collective ability—and obligation—to confront, in full, governmentsanctioned abuses or missteps?
The benefits of automated law enforcement in the form of
increased efficiency and consistency are readily apparent and
discussed below. In theory, better enforcement reduces crime by
increasing the likelihood of punishment, among other things. More
consistent decisions through automation can mitigate the harmful
effects of enforcement bias and related abuse of discretion harms.43
Citizens are, in theory, all held to a more consistent standard,
resulting in a harmonization regarding the particular boundaries and
interpretation of the law.
But it is critical to consider carefully the long-term and
nuanced implications of ceding human decision-making to humanderived, but computer-driven, algorithms that seemingly streamline,
simplify, and reduce the cost of more traditional methods but reduce
human agency at all junctures. The imperfections of current
automated law enforcement systems most certainly are considerable
and should cause the prudent critic to pause; the perfected system, if
even possible and whatever that “ideal” system may look like, can be
equally troubling, however, since we naturally cringe at the concept
of omniscient governmental control due to the value we place on
freedom and privacy.
III. A THEORY OF INEFFICIENTLY AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT
The central premise of our theory is that inefficiency and
indeterminacy (in the form of human actors with free will) are vital
components within the law enforcement process and should be
conserved in some form. When one aspect of a law enforcement
process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is automated to increase
efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and indeterminacy should
generally be proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the
process to prevent harms from automation. Automating surveillance,
analysis, or action makes it important to ensure that inefficiency or
indeterminism is correspondingly preserved or introduced into the
rest of the system to protect social welfare and prevent harm. In
42. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classics 1961) (1949).
43. See Elizabeth Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 199, 232-33 (2007).
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short, we argue that inefficiency and human intervention should be
conserved in automated enforcement systems through reallocation.
In previous research, we identified potential problems with
automated law enforcement systems, including concerns about
inaccuracy, bias, due process, privacy, inflexibility, overenforcement, and abuse.44 Many of these concerns are viable because
automation decreases the transaction cost of surveillance of
individuals, the analysis of that surveilled data, and actions based
upon that analysis. In other words, the elevated concern over
automated law enforcement is primarily due to the fact that
efficiency brings reduced transaction costs which, in turn,
encourages greater use of surveillance, analysis, and action
(punishment), leading to reduced privacy, due process concerns, 45
and the specter of perfect enforcement culminating in an Orwellian
police state.
It is important to note that we do not argue that automated
technologies are inherently problematic. Robots and other automated
technologies hold great promise to dramatically improve the lives of
everyone on earth. Rather, it is at the intersection of automation and
legal obligation where we urge caution. Automated systems enable at
least two dramatic departures from the status quo. First, automated
systems are highly efficient, which can reduce the cost of
surveillance, analysis, and enforcement to negligible levels per
incident.46 Manual surveillance, analysis, and enforcement require
manpower, money, and time. Automation can be centralized, cheap,
and virtually instantaneous. Second, automated systems are
44. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10; SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
45. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249 (2008).
The development of highly efficient automated law enforcement
systems without corresponding inefficiencies afforded to due process threatens
subjects’ abilities to rebut accusations or appeal convictions, effectively pitting
highly automated government systems against the human subject’s personal time to
resolve wrongs and provide self-defense. Asymmetries such as these are seen in
voice mail systems that force users to navigate byzantine menus, wait on hold, and
tolerate canned music to ultimately reach a human operator, effectively acting to
shield bureaucracies against interaction with the public. Janie Emaus, Help! I’m
Stuck in Voicemail Hell, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 30, 2013, 5:15 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/janie-emaus/help-im-stuck-in-voicemai_b_3481364.html; see
also DIAL A HUMAN, http://www.dialahuman.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
46. Maggie Clark, Red-Light Cameras Generate Revenue, Controversy,
USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/10/15/stateline-red-light-cameras/2986577/ (discussing the significant
efficiency and revenue).
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completely predictable. They will react to the same input in the exact
same way every single time. In this way, they are determinate
because there is no room for choice in a given model.47 Thus,
automated law enforcement holds the promise of efficiency and
consistency. We anticipate that these advantages will motivate and
be used to justify the adoption of automated technologies.
We assert that inefficiency and indeterminacy in the form of
human intervention and deliberate technological restriction are
relative virtues of our current law enforcement system, not a
drawback. Not only does inefficiency and indeterminacy allow for
more contextualized, localized, and adaptive decision-making, but
they also help obviate the dilemma of the perfect enforcement of
laws that were drafted with likely assumptions that enforcement
would be resource intensive and, thus, optimize justified
enforcement attempts.48 Although this theory might seem regressive,
both inefficiency and indeterminacy humanize the automated law
enforcement process and make it palatable for a free society. As a
result, they should be accounted for and relatively conserved by
those who would implement automated systems. In this Part, we
discuss the virtue of inefficiency and indeterminacy and the different
ways in which they may be created and preserved.
A. Inefficiency
Law enforcement is, by and large, inefficient. It costs time and
resources for most crimes to be detected, investigated, prosecuted,
and punished. These costs can burden law enforcement. The number
of crimes committed is inevitably more than the number processed
through to punishment. Standing alone, this innate inefficiency might
appear as a flaw within the law enforcement system. However, we
assert that it is an essential counter to the potential totality and
flawlessness of a completely automated system. It necessarily
disrupts and delays the rote, mechanical processing of preprogrammed procedures thereby allowing human intervention at
critical points in the system.
Consider the issuance of a speeding ticket. In analog policing
regimes, a police officer might wait in a concealed location and
47. See generally Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2011).
48. For an exploration of the absurd results, from developing code to
enforcing laws that failed to contemplate de minimis transaction costs for
enforcement, see SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
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capture a vehicle’s instantaneous speed as it passes by. If this speed
crosses the officer’s own particular enforcement threshold, the police
officer will stop the car, engage the driver, and potentially issue a
ticket. However, an automated system could maintain a continuous
flow of samples based on driving behavior and issue tickets
accordingly. Our previous experiment demonstrated that a typical
driver could be issued over 500 tickets in a one hour trip on a
commuting route where there were at most two police cars stationed
on a given day and often none at all. There are at least three different
kinds of inefficiencies that can maintain the transaction cost of
enforcement at desirable levels: (1) human intervention in “the
loop”; (2) countermeasures; and (3) technical governors.
1. Human Intervention in “The Loop”
The process of law enforcement has historically relied heavily
on human police, investigators, judicial officials, and correctional
officers to function. Operating at human speed, rather than the much
faster machine speed, law enforcement systems traditionally
possessed inherent inefficiencies and extensive human intervention
that greatly limited the type, extent, and duration of surveillance;
prioritized enforcement of the law; contextualized decision-making;
and moderated the law’s social impact. The bulk of laws on the
books and the rich history of precedent on which today’s legal
decisions are based spring from this analog environment and assume
this tradition of human intervention.
We are entering a new era when large portions of the law
enforcement process may be automated, however, potentially with
little to no human oversight or intervention. Enabling technologies—
such as robotics, sensors, networking, and machine learning—are
now removing these barriers and important friction from the process.
These advances, which promise greater efficiency and accuracy at a
greatly reduced cost (and sometimes increased profit),49 are
welcomed by officials in the quest for improved public safety
through more efficient enforcement of the law. Emerging today are
end-to-end automated law enforcement systems that include
49. See Christopher K. Walker, Red-Light Cameras: How States Jeopardize
Safety by Manipulating Yellow-Light Intervals to Earn a Quick Buck, 7 J. LEGAL
TECH. RISK MGMT. 222, 243, 259 (2014). These systems can then be productized
and sold. As an example, see Photo Enforcement Systems, XEROX,
http://services.xerox.com/transportation-solutions/transportation-managementsystems/photo-enforcement/enus.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
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surveillance, crime detection, legal processing, and punishment of
certain laws or classes of laws, for example, red-light violations at
intersections and violations of speed limits.50 Little has been done,
however, to assess the social impact of human absence from the
process.
2. Countermeasures
We define countermeasures to mean actions taken in response
to perceived threats from automation of some aspect of law
enforcement.51 Our previous analysis of automating enforcement of
one type of law led to explorations of countermeasures of
surveillance, the first necessary step in automating the law.52 Few
would tolerate receiving 500 tickets during a one-hour trip, as our
study indicated.53 Evidence already shows that an overzealous
approach to law enforcement encourages individuals and
organizations to take (sometimes illegal) countermeasures.54
For instance, earlier this year as a protest against the European
Police Congress held in Berlin, German activists created a real-world
“game” awarding points to teams who destroyed or removed
surveillance cameras in major German cities, with bonus points for
creative techniques.55 The likelihood and acceptability of
countermeasures are far greater with the human actor removed from
the process, for no longer is the citizen acting against the police
officer, the investigator, or the court official, but instead against
faceless technology employed against the populace, a far more
palatable target of resistance.
Elizabeth Joh has called countermeasures to surveillance in
certain contexts “privacy protests.” She writes:
Ordinary American life today cannot be easily lived without being
targeted by government surveillance. Many, if not most, people acquiesce
to these demands for information about them, either out of acceptance or
resignation.
But some people object. They take steps to thwart police surveillance,
not because they are seeking to conceal criminal acts, but out of

50. ECCLES ET AL., supra note 20, at 37, 43.
51. Shay et al., supra note 24, at 191.
52. SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
53. See id. at 17-20.
54. See Shay et al., supra note 24, at 191.
55. Kim Zetter, German Activists Punch Out Big Brother’s Eyes, WIRED
(Jan. 31, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/camover-targets-cctvs/.
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ideological belief or personal conviction. Advice on “surveillance
defense” and counter-surveillance products is readily available on the
internet: Use Tor to surf the internet. Encrypt your digital
communications. Use disposable “guerilla email” addresses and
disposable phone numbers. Avoid ordinary credit cards and choose only
cash, prepaid debit cards, or bitcoins to make a financial trail harder to
detect. Avoid cell phones unless they are “burners” (prepaid phones),
“dumb phones,” or “freedom phones” from Asia that have had all tracking
devices removed. Alternatively, hide your smartphone in an ad hoc
Faraday cage, like a refrigerator, to avoid being tracked. Use photoblocker
film on a license plate or a ski mask to thwart a red-light camera. Use a
Spyfinder camera detector to see if someone is watching you. Use “spoof
cards” that mask your identity on caller identification devices. Burn your
garbage to hamper investigations of your financial records or the
collection of your genetic information. Hire a professional to alter your
digital self on the internet by erasing data or posting multiple false
identities. At the extreme end, you could live “off the grid” and cut off all
contact with the modern world.56

Countermeasures could play a critical role in conserving both
inefficiency and indeterminacy in an automated system. By their
very nature, countermeasures aim to frustrate enforcement efforts. If
effective, they render these efforts inefficient because greater
resources will be required to make them work. Countermeasures also
preserve indeterminacy, at least for the surveilled, by helping ensure
that surveillance, analysis, and enforcement are not guaranteed.
Policy makers should be mindful of the availability and legality
of countermeasures when automating a system. To the extent that
countermeasures are desirable, they should not be explicitly
prohibited. One notorious instance where perfect enforcement has
been sought and countermeasures have been explicitly prohibited is
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) ban on
circumventing technological copyright controls.57 The DMCA
attempts to mandate respect for digital rights management (DRM) by
instituting anticircumvention provisions into U.S. copyright law.58
These provisions are, “in effect, a ban on the act of circumventing or
trafficking in devices that circumvent certain DRM systems.”59

56. Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth
Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1000-01 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2012).
58. See id.; Mulligan, supra note 36, at 26-27 (discussing digital rights
management).
59. Woodrow Neal Hartzog, Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the “Fail-Safe”
Triennial Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective in
Protecting Fair Use?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 312-13 (2005).
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In some instances, countermeasures should even be explicitly
allowed.60 Given the uncertainty in many computer crime laws,
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, it is not entirely clear
when countermeasures may be deployed in response to government
surveillance, analysis, and action.61
3. Technical and Procedural Governors
Technical governors are mechanisms created by technologies
or regulation that reduce the capability of a sub-system within the
automated law enforcement framework.62 For instance, law
enforcement officials must follow the appropriate authorization
process before they can install a wiretap.63 The limit to the number of
phone calls monitored is determined by law, not a limitation of the
underlying technology. Law enforcement officials must follow the
appropriate authorization process before installing a GPS tracker on
a suspect’s vehicle.64 Again, the limitation on tracking cars is due to a
constraint imposed by the law, not a limitation of the technology.
Professor Paul Ohm has proposed that privacy and
transparency goals can be simultaneously achieved by making
information “hard but possible” to obtain.65 Harry Surden has
likewise recognized the value in high transactional costs to protect
privacy, noting that “[s]ociety relies upon . . . latent structural
constraints to reliably inhibit certain unwanted conduct in a way that
is functionally comparable to its use of law. For example, society has
frequently depended upon the search costs involved in aggregating
and analyzing large amounts of information to effectively protect

60. For example, being able to use a mask to thwart facial recognition
technologies or a pseudonym to protect identity should be preserved in some settings
to foster First Amendment values. See Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real
Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815 (2013); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice)
Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy Enhancing Technology,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 966 (2013) (“A government concerned with protecting
personal privacy and enhancing user security against ID theft and other fraud should
support and advocate for the widespread use of [privacy enhancing technologies].”).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
62. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10.
63. Id. §§ 2510-22.
64. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
65. Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 63.
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anonymity.”66 These theories for protecting privacy by imposing
artificial transaction costs could be expanded to protect against many
different kinds of harm made possible through automation.
B. Indeterminacy
The second concept that automated systems should be designed
to preserve is indeterminacy. As a term of art, if something is
determinate, then it has a constrained predictability. Consequently,
indeterminate systems have fewer constraints on predictability and,
as a result, are more random. Computer algorithms are usually
implemented using deterministic state machines, systems where the
transitions from state to state are uniquely determined.67 In other
words, the algorithm will always produce the same output for a given
input under the same conditions: If a car is detected to exceed a
speed limit, a traffic ticket will be issued.
While this predictability and repeatability is desirable in most
software systems, it can be overly constraining in a legal system
where the accused would like to account for extenuating and
mitigating circumstances. In our previous research, we argued:
Many crimes provide for a necessity defense for violators who can
demonstrate that violation of the law was required to prevent harm.
Specifically, the necessity defense has been recognized where “criminal
action was necessary to avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be
prevented by the statute defining the offense.” It is not difficult to imagine
scenarios where activity in violation of the law is justified by necessity.
For example, speeding might be justified to rush someone needing urgent
medical care to the hospital. Reckless driving might be justified if the
driver was avoiding obstructions in the road. Those under restraining
orders might not be able to return home because the only route is via a
bridge that lies within the restricted area.68

Indeterminacy, defined as the condition or quality of
uncertainty, seems a strange characteristic to be desired within the
rule of law spectrum, yet it illuminates an essential entry point for
humans in the automated law enforcement system. In literary studies,
indeterminacy requires readers to interpret their own meaning when
faced with textual uncertainty, in a sense, to create meaning from
those elliptical moments within a text based on personal experience
66. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605,
1605 (2007).
67. FRANK VAHID, DIGITAL DESIGN WITH RTL DESIGN, VHDL, AND
VERILOG 142 (2d ed. 2011).
68. SHAY ET AL., supra note 10, at 38 (footnotes omitted).
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and intuition.69 In other words, indeterminacy calls upon a reader to
fill in meaning gaps. In law enforcement, indeterminacy recognizes
that the data provided by a set of sensors might be incomplete, and a
decision based solely on that data would be inaccurate or invalid.
Thus, the human-in-the-loop is a desired insertion at moments of
legal indeterminacy in order to complete the narrative, using
intuition and an understanding and appreciation for the full range of
human experience combined with legal knowledge. Indeterminacy
ensures that the process of automated enforcement is extended and
iterative in order to add meaning and certainty to the information
collected, analyzed, and acted upon.
It is also worth noting that certain human characteristics, such
as empathy, are difficult to program into systems. Thus, in the
process of becoming determinate, programmers code intangibles like
empathy out of the system. Perhaps one of the most vivid reasons to
preserve uncertainty via humans is the preservation of these
intangibles that can help produce outcomes that might be desirable,
even if those outcomes constitute a deviation from predictable
standard protocol.
In practical terms, if automation is increased at one point in the
automated law enforcement system, indeterminacy would be
achieved by human intervention “downstream,” or after the point at
which the automation was increased. If surveillance is automated,
keep humans in “the loop” to review or interpret the surveillance
data, or at least data flagged as an indicator of suspicious activity. If
analysis is automated, have a human review the analysis decision. If
enforcement is automated, maintain a human-mediated appeals
process.
C. The Benefits of Conservation
1. Contextualized Decisions
One of the most difficult aspects of designing an automated
system is that all decisions about how the system will respond in any
given situation must be made ex ante. In our previous research, we
stated:

69. “Indeterminacy” is a relatively common literary term (at least for
specialists in literature). See CHRIS BALDICK, Indeterminacy, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS (3d ed. 2008).
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Despite the best intentions of designers, any model of the law and of the
physical world is, by definition, a simplification. Environmental variables
will fall outside the model and lead to error. Potholes develop, trees fall
across roads, and streets become icy. Lack of context as well as absence of
the traditional police officer’s domain knowledge is likely, and in some
cases inevitable, due to lack of appropriate sensor data or inability to
process higher level cognitive functions in software.70

We noted that “[a] robotic car . . . might slide through a stop sign due
to snow and possibly record that it did stop because the wheels
stopped turning. Or the car might drive 15 MPH on a freeway
because a repair crew forgot to take down an RFID-enabled
construction zone sign.”71
Fully automated systems lack the ability to contextualize
alleged crimes. For instance, violating speed limits and traffic signals
might in some cases be not only morally justified but potentially
even obligated, for the protection of life or limb perhaps.
In a very helpful essay, Professor Patrick Lin explored the
limits of automated decision-making and the importance of context
in these decisions for driverless vehicles. Lin began:
If a small tree branch pokes out onto a highway and there’s no incoming
traffic, we’d simply drift a little into the opposite lane and drive around it.
But an automated car might come to a full stop, as it dutifully observes
traffic laws that prohibit crossing a double-yellow line. This unexpected
move would avoid bumping the object in front, but then cause a crash with
the human drivers behind it.
Should we trust robotic cars to share our road, just because they are
programmed to obey the law and avoid crashes?72

Lin argued:
Our laws are ill-equipped to deal with the rise of these vehicles . . . . For
example, is it enough for a robot car to pass a human driving test? In
licensing automated cars as street-legal, some commentators believe that
it’d be unfair to hold manufacturers to a higher standard than humans, that
is, to make an automated car undergo a much more rigorous test than a
new teenage driver.73

According to Lin,
[T]here are important differences between humans and machines that
could warrant a stricter test. For one thing, we’re reasonably confident that
70. SHAY ET AL., supra note 35, at 25.
71. Id.
72. Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8,
2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-ofautonomous-cars/280360/.
73. Id.
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human drivers can exercise judgment in a wide range of dynamic
situations that don’t appear in a standard 40-minute driving test; we
presume they can act ethically and wisely. 74

Lin also sees the potential problem from automating legal
compliance, stating:
[B]ecause the legal framework for autonomous vehicles does not yet exist,
we have the opportunity to build one that is informed by ethics. This will
be the challenge in creating laws and policies that govern automated cars:
We need to ensure they make moral sense. Programming a robot car to
slavishly follow the law, for instance, might be foolish and dangerous.75

Designers are charged with creating a system that responds
appropriately to contextual variations. For the time being, these
systems have a limited capacity to make such nuanced distinctions.76
Prioritizing human discretion through conserved inefficiency and
indeterminacy will ensure that a partially automated law enforcement
system is adaptable and capable of fine-grained decisions based upon
various contexts.
2. Mitigating Harm
In previous research, we documented the harm that can come
from improperly automated law enforcement. We stated:
Any automated law enforcement system must be sure to institute
procedural safeguards against automation bias and due process violations,
as well as ensuring an opportunity to appeal punishment. Additionally,
automated law enforcement systems should be designed to minimize their
enormous potential to commit egregious privacy violations under the
Fourth Amendment, electronic surveillance regimes, and other privacy
laws.77

Automation bias refers to the human tendency to irrationally
trust automated decisions. Professor Danielle Citron has noted:
Studies show that human beings rely on automated decisions even when
they suspect system malfunction. The impulse to follow a computer’s
recommendation flows from human “automation bias”—the “use of
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Farivar, Perfect Enforcement, supra note 10; Matt Richtel
& Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run into Problem: Cars with
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/ technology/
personaltech/google-says-its-not-the-driverless-cars-fault-its-other-drivers.html?_r=0.
77. SHAY ET AL., supra note 10, at 34 (citing Kenneth A. Bamberger,
Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV.
669 (2010); Citron, supra note 45.
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automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and
processing.” Automation bias effectively turns a computer program’s
suggested answer into a trusted final decision.78

The privacy of individuals is potentially threatened by nearly
every automated law enforcement system capability. While the most
obvious threat to privacy might be the pervasive surveillance enabled
by ubiquitous sensors, automated information analysis might also
spark privacy concerns, particularly in the age of “big data,” where
algorithms comb through piles of information for hidden or
surprising correlations and inferences.79 Conserving inefficiency and
indeterminacy will mitigate the harms from surveillance from a sheer
reduction in scope and number of people surveilled. Inefficient
surveillance requires prioritization about how to expend limited
resources. Meanwhile, indeterminacy will mitigate the harms from
erroneous data analysis by allowing humans to make sense of the
complexity involved in understanding data and language. For
example, IBM’s Watson has difficulty understanding slang and
distinguishing between polite and impolite language.80
Conserving inefficiency and indeterminacy will also help
mitigate harms to the freedom of expression. For example, consider
the importance of countermeasures against surveillance. In exploring
anti-mask laws and online real-name policies, Margot Kaminski
78. Citron, supra note 45, at 1271-72 (citing Raja Parasuraman &
Christopher A. Miller, Trust and Etiquette in High-Criticality Automated Systems,
47 COMM. ACM 51, 52 (2004); Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors:
Are Crews Better than Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2000)).
79. Ira Rubinstein defines big data as a problem-solving philosophy that
leverages massive datasets and algorithmic analysis to extract “hidden information
and surprising correlations.” Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a
New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74, 74 (2013). The term “big data” has
no broadly accepted definition and has been defined many different ways. See
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013) (“There is no
rigorous definition of big data . . . . One way to think about the issue today . . . is
this: big data refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a
smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value . . . .”).
80. IBM’s Computer Wins ‘Jeopardy!’ but . . . Toronto?, CTV NEWS (Feb.
15, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/ibm-s-computer-wins-jeopardy-buttoronto-1.608022; Alexis C. Madrigal, IBM’s Watson Memorized the Entire ‘Urban
Dictionary,’ Then His Overlords Had to Delete It, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/ibms-watson-memorizedthe-entire-urban-dictionary-then-his-overlords-had-to-delete-it/267047/;
Michal
Lev-Ram, Teaching IBM’s Watson the Meaning of ‘OMG,’ FORTUNE (Jan. 7, 2013,
10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2013/01/07/teaching-ibms-watson-the-meaning-ofomg/.
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asked, “Can the government impose a blanket ban on anonymity to
thwart the masked and uncatchable bank robber, at the expense of
the mask-wearing protester?”81 She concludes that “[a] blanket realworld ban on anonymity . . . chills protected expression; and physical
anonymity is becoming increasingly important in today’s
surveillance society.”82
Kaminski reaches a similar conclusion with respect to realname policies.83 The power of anonymity has grown exponentially
over the past decade with the government employment of facial
recognition software within existing surveillance systems. 84 The
mask, then, becomes a powerful countermeasure by hiding the
wearer’s identity not only from the gaze of the police officer and the
looming camera, but also from the probing software and its
impressive searching and archiving capacities. Veiled identity on the
Internet likewise thwarts the gaze of the NSA and cyber law
enforcers, but technology is increasingly capable of circumventing
attempts at anonymity, as has been recently revealed by the release
of the Snowden documents.85
Consider, for instance, Seattle city officials’ debate to use $1.6
million of federal grant money to purchase a city-wide surveillance
system that includes state-of-the-art facial recognition software.86
This grant, available under the Department of Homeland Security’s
Urban Area Security Initiative, would allow for enhanced
surveillance across the Emerald City:
Those Department of Homeland Security dollars would let the Seattle
police pay for software that digitally scans surveillance camera footage
and then tries to match images of the individuals caught on tape with any
one of the 350,000-or-so people who have been photographed previously
by King County, Washington law enforcement.87

81. Kaminski, supra note 60, at 818.
82. Id.
83. These are policies that websites like Facebook place in their terms of
use agreements that prohibit users from using a pseudonym or require them to use
their legal name. Id. at 879.
84. Id. at 890.
85. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014).
86. Seattle Considering $1.6 Million Facial Recognition Surveillance
System, RT (Feb. 20, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.rt.com/usa/seattle-surveillancedhs-grant-943.
87. Id.

Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement

1791

Privacy advocates are understandably concerned about the
potential harm of such an intelligent system.88 Other cities across the
U.S., such as San Diego and Daytona Beach, have already
successfully fielded software-enhanced surveillance systems.89
Whereas now humans are involved in the processing and screening
of the captured images, the potential exists for the system to become
fully automated in the not-so-distant future. The proliferation of
countermeasures—masked and otherwise—is inevitable given this
exponential increase in surveillance scope and power.
3. Social Development and Inhibitor of Perfect Enforcement
Deterministic law enforcement systems with negligible
transaction costs per attempt raise the possibility of perfect
enforcement of law—as a relatively attainable goal if not a reality. In
previous research we noted that any automated system must
ultimately confront the question: “How many violations of the law
should be explicitly forgiven or ignored?”90 Where discretion focuses
on the preservation or elimination of individual contextual judgment,
the perfection-of-enforcement question requires system-level
determinations of when to ignore legal violations. Should any or all
laws be perfectly enforced? If not, what is the proper “tolerance” for
the system?
If perfect enforcement is possible, that is, an ex ante decision
for zero tolerance for legal violations, the temptation to embrace
perfection is strong. As Jonathan Zittrain noted, “Few would choose
to tolerate a murder, making it a good candidate for preemption
through design, were that possible.”91 In exploring “impossibility
structures” for enforcing various laws, Michael Rich noted:
Preventing drunk driving is a low hanging fruit when it comes to making
criminal conduct impossible. The crime requires technology for its
completion and is essentially defined by a technological measurement.
Thus, adapting automotive technology to incorporate the measurement of
88. Id.
89. See Dave Maass, Going to San Diego Comic-Con? Put On Your Mask
for the Surveillance Camera Network, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 22, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/operation-secure-san-diego; THE CITY OF
DAYTONA BEACH, OFFICE OF THE PURCHASING AGENT, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS:
INVITATION 10 (2014), http://purchasing.codb.us/documents/RFP%200415-3630%
20Video%20Surveillance.pdf.
90. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
91. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP
IT 120 (2008).
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the driver’s BAL is intuitive, if not technologically simple. Moreover, the
harms resulting from drunk driving are severe and widespread, making
[this] more politically feasible than other potential impossibility
structures.92

Yet we caution strongly against a goal of perfect enforcement,
particularly through a zero-tolerance strategy of automated ex post
punishment. Even impossibility structures are problematic. As Rich
noted with respect to drunk driving, “[E]ven . . . a straightforward
impossibility structure gives rise to a tangle of constitutional, legal,
and policy issues. These issues likely will only multiply as the
targets of impossibility structures migrate outward from this natural
origin of technology-related crimes.”93 Rich continued:
[A] few areas seem ripe for the introduction of impossibility structures.
The first would be other offenses involving the operation of automobiles,
such as speeding, running a red light, or failing to wear a seat belt, that can
result in death and serious bodily harm. From a technological standpoint,
these should be easy to make impossible, and much of the technology
needed to do so is already under development. . . . Crimes that take place
over the Internet, such as cyberbullying and cyberstalking, hacking,
distributing child pornography, and theft of intellectual property, may also
be amenable to impossibility structures in that they require technology for
their commission. Although such crimes are disparate in how they are
committed, and thus how they might be rendered impossible, they give
rise to some common concerns.94

Inefficiency and indeterminism are perhaps most important in
light of the long-term implications of automated law enforcement.
Beyond specific circumstances where legal violations might be
excused, certain countermeasures and the ability to break the law are
necessary for social growth and stability. Preventing perfect
enforcement through inefficiency and indeterminacy preserves this
necessary breathing space for society to thrive. In short, a perfected
system does not necessarily equate to perfect justice in our humane
understanding of the concept.
4. The Cost of Conservation and Benefits of Automation
However, there are incentives that work against this principle,
including the desire to reduce the cost of law enforcement (or even
profit from it). Red-light cameras produce considerable revenue for
92. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 795, 846-47 (2013).
93. Id. at 847.
94. Id.
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cities that employ them.95 For example, Philadelphia earned
$17 million in fines from red-light cameras in 2013.96 And these
cameras never take a day off, never get sick, have no need for
medical insurance, and will never draw a pension when they are
replaced.
A conservation approach will often mean preserving police
discretion, which has acknowledged problems.97 Elizabeth Joh has
noted:
While harboring stereotypes is not a characteristic peculiar to the police,
the authority delegated to the police makes stereotyping especially
dangerous in that profession. . . . As many have observed, the harms of
this abuse of police discretion extend beyond the wasted time and
annoyance of minority drivers. It is a demoralizing experience for an
individual to be singled out primarily due to race or ethnicity. When
repeated hundreds or thousands of times against members of a particular
racial or ethnic group, however, these experiences alienate the entire
affected community.98

Joh explored the value of automating away police discretion,
stating that “the effects of a widespread automated enforcement
regime would be dramatic.”99 As an example, Joh noted that “[t]raffic
stops are often pretextual, a means for discovering evidence of other
crimes unrelated to the justification for the initial stop. Thus, if
traffic stops were eliminated through widespread automated
enforcement, the nature of policing could be drastically different.”100
Those applying the conservation theory to automated enforcement
should be mindful of the advantages of eliminating discretion in
certain areas or in certain ways.
D. Applying the Theory
When this ideal system is decomposed into its component
parts—the iterative steps of an automated legal process—room does
of course exist at certain carefully considered points for the
precision, comprehensiveness, and rigor offered by automated
technology. These questions then arise: Where in the process could
95. See Walker, supra note 49, at 243; Clark, supra note 46.
96. Emily Babay, Grace Period Ends for West Oak Lane Red-Light
Cameras, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:24 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/Grace_period_ends_for_West_Oak_Lane_red-light_cameras.html.
97. Joh, supra note 43, at 208.
98. Id. at 208, 211 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
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or should automation trump human decision? To what extent can it
go unchecked, if at all? And how do we keep techno-creep—our
slow but steady relinquishment of control to technology101—from
overriding what is necessarily a human-designed and governed
system controlled through continually regulated checks and
balances?
The theory of governance for the automated enforcement of the
law proposed here aims to answer these questions by focusing on
reallocation of inefficiency and indeterminism. When one aspect of a
law enforcement process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is
automated to increase efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and
indeterminacy should generally be explicitly preserved elsewhere in
the process to prevent harms from automation. Automating
surveillance, analysis, or action makes it important to ensure that
inefficiency or indeterminism is correspondingly preserved or
introduced into the rest of the system to protect social welfare and
prevent societal harm.
Where inefficiency and indeterminism are reallocated will
entirely be dependent upon context, making this a general theory that
is broadly applicable but in need of refinement in specific
circumstances. Generally speaking, inefficiency and indeterminism
can be conserved instantaneously at the point of surveillance,
analysis, or action, or after the fact—as a backstop in the appeals
process, for example.
Consider red-light cameras. In journalist Cyrus Farivar’s indepth exploration into red-light cameras for Ars Technica, he
investigated the installation and use of red-light cameras by the
commercial vendor Redflex in Modesto, California.102 He
interviewed a police officer who reviewed the tickets, writing:
Modesto Police officer Steve Silva, a 34-year police veteran who
personally approves each ticket, denies about 20 percent of the cases that
the Redflex system presents to him. “I have to see a good violation,” he
told me. “If I can’t identify the driver, the picture is too bad quality . . .
sometimes there’s a big vehicle blocking the limit line, sometimes it’s just
real close, and I’ll dismiss it because any doubt goes to the citizens, 100
percent.”
Each morning when Silva arrives at work, Redflex usually has data on
40 cars that might have run the cameras. Line by line, day by day, Silva
checks each entry on the Redflex website. Was the car over the line? Was
101. See generally Thomas P. Keenan, TECHNO CREEP: THE SURRENDER
PRIVACY AND THE CAPITALIZATION OF INTIMACY (2014).
102. Farivar, Perfect Enforcement, supra note 10.
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the light red? Was the photo clear? Does the photo of the driver match
DMV records? This task takes him a few painstaking hours each day to go
through completely.103

In some instances, a regulatory response can be used to
conserve inefficiency and indeterminacy. For example, Iowa City
drafted a municipal ordinance that reads:
The City shall not: . . . Use any automatic traffic surveillance system or
device, automatic license plate recognition system or device, or domestic
drone system or device for the enforcement of a qualified traffic law
violation, unless a peace officer or Parking Enforcement Attendant is
present at the scene, witnesses the event, and personally issues the ticket to
the alleged violator at the time and location of the vehicle.104

Iowa City embraced the conservation theory by injecting both
inefficiency and indeterminacy not simply “in the loop,” but at the
geographic locus of surveillance, action, and enforcement.
CONCLUSION
As red-light cameras and radar speed traps have demonstrated,
technology already exists for automating all parts of the automated
law enforcement process outlined in this Article: surveillance,
analysis, and action. Fortunately, these examples impose only
relatively minor civil penalties—they are a far cry from the fictional
character “Robocop.” Failures in the system will be annoying to the
innocent victim, but not catastrophic. However, robots are used in
law enforcement applications, and as Knightscope’s K5 robot
demonstrated, this is just the initial entry point into a potentially
large and lucrative market. As we have seen, automation of
surveillance has become widespread, and automation of analysis and
action are increasingly common. The improvements in technology
and the economic incentive to replace people with computers and
robots form powerful arguments in favor of completely automated
law enforcement systems. But arguments based on greater efficiency,
reduced cost, and even reduced bias must be evaluated holistically,
especially with regard to the overall effect of ubiquitous automated
law enforcement systems on society.
This Article examined the societal harms from overreliance on
automation at any stage in the automated law enforcement process
and especially the full automation of the entire process. Writers from
103.
104.

Id.
Farivar, supra note 23.
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Plato to Patrick Lin warn against rigid enforcement of laws that were
never intended to cover every possible contingency in every
situation.
This Article proposed a theory to govern the automation of the
law enforcement process. The theory states that whenever
automation is introduced or expanded in one part of the automated
law enforcement process in order to increase efficiency and
determinacy, inefficiency and indeterminacy should generally be
proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the process to
prevent harms from automation. Although perhaps counterintuitive,
we assert that indeterminacy and inefficiency are necessary and
desirable components of any automated law enforcement process,
not weaknesses in the system.
Once adopted, automated systems become entrenched and
difficult to modify, so the initial design and implementation of
automated law enforcement systems must preserve an adequate
amount of indeterminacy and inefficiency. Given the effect
automated law enforcement systems can have on our core interests of
freedom, autonomy, due process, and privacy, there is simply too
much at stake to place cost and efficiency above all other concerns.

